SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN BANKRUPTCY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent bankruptcy cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope
to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the more
interestingchanges in this area of practice.
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BANKRUPTCY-JURY TRIALS-CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE BRINGING
ESSENTIALLY LEGAL CLAIM AGAINST CREDITOR

Is

ENTITLED

TRIAL--Germain v. Connecticut Nat. Bank, 988 F.2d
1323 (2d Cir. 1992).

TO JURY

On January 18, 1984, O'Sullivan's Fuel Oil Co., Inc. (the
debtor), a retailer and transporter of fuel oil, filed a voluntary
petition under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code).
988 F.2d at 1325. The case was converted to a chapter 7 proceeding in 1986, and Thomas Germain (trustee) was appointed
trustee of the debtor's estate. Subsequently, Connecticut National Bank (CNB) filed a proof of claim. Six months later, on
May 29, 1987, the trustee brought suit in Connecticut state court
against CNB.
The underlying suit, involving six separate causes of action,
essentially charged that as the debtor's primary lender, CNB exerted improper control over the debtor. Id. at 1325-26. The alleged improper control included threats to file an involuntary
bankruptcy petition unless management of the debtor was relinquished to a successor chosen by CNB, threats to terminate postpetition financing if the successor was removed, and threats to
convert the reorganization to a chapter 7 liquidation and drive
the debtor out of business. Id. at 1326. The trustee further asserted that although CNB surrendered control on August 24,
1984, CNB's tortious conduct caused irreparable waste of the
debtor's assets, and made liquidation inevitable. The trustee
therefore sought money damages for coercion and duress, deceptive or unfair business practices, misrepresentation, breach of
the contractual duty of good faith, and tortious interference with
the business of the debtor.
CNB removed the state court action to the bankruptcy court,
and the trustee requested a jury trial. Id. at 1325. The trustee
then moved, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), to have the case
withdrawn from bankruptcy court based in part on the jury trial
request. Pending resolution of whether the underlying suit was a
"core proceeding" under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b), the motion was
stayed. Embracing recommendations of the bankruptcy court,
the district court ruled that ajury trial was proper despite the fact
that the action was "core," and CNB appealed. Id. at 1325-26.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Chief Judge Meskill, writing for the court,
first noted that the issue on appeal was not the merits of the un1913

1914

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1913

derlying claims, but whether the trustee was entitled to a jury
trial based on the character of the claims and the context in
which they arose. Id. at 1326. The chief judge articulated that
the right to a jury trial in an action brought in federal court is
governed by federal law. Id. Determination of whether the
trustee enjoys such a right under federal law, the court maintained, required examination of the relationship between the
bankruptcy proceedings and the trustee's claims. Id.
Exploring this relationship, the chief judge asserted that because the right to ajury trial stems from the Constitution, classification of the trustee's action as a "core" proceeding was of little
consequence in resolving the jury trial issue. Id. at 1326-27. The
chiefjudge further declared that adjudication of the trustee's underlying state action would not affect the bankruptcy claims allowance process with regard to CNB's claim against the estate.
Id. at 1327. The court concluded that the trustee's action was
independent of the bankruptcy proceedings, and that allowance
of CNB's claim prior to a separate hearing on the trustee's complaint would produce a result consistent with the Code.
Chief Judge Meskill distinguished the present facts from
cases in which a trustee was permitted, over creditors' objections,
to void preferential transfers without a jury trial. Id. (citing
Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966); Langenkamp v. Culp, 498
U.S. 42 (1990)). Unlike the trustee's lender liability suit, the circuit judge stated, an action to void a preferential transfer must be
resolved as part of the claims allowance process. Id. (citing 11
U.S.C. § 502(d)). Mere filing of a proof of claim, the chiefjudge
averred, does not trigger the claims allowance process. Id. The
claims allowance process is implicated, the court stated, only if
resolution of the underlying suit affects allowance of the creditor's claim. Id. Therefore, the court declared, because the
trustee's action would augment the bankruptcy estate but would
not affect the creditor's claim, it was not part of the claims allowance process. Id.
Addressing the substance of the trustee's complaint, the
court observed that although the complaint related to issues governed by the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee did not raise any
bankruptcy claims. Id. at 1328. The focus of the allegations, the
court maintained, was lender liability and destruction of the
debtor's business. Id. Although the complaint accused CNB of
coercion through threats to violate the automatic stay, the court
determined that such a threat did not constitute a violation of the
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stay. Id. Likewise, the chief judge remarked, the allegations that
CNB exercised improper control over the debtor's business did
not give rise to any cognizable claim in bankruptcy. Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that in essence the action was a suit at
common law, remote from the bankruptcy process.
The court next confronted CNB's assertion that because the
complaint failed to state a legal claim or seek legal relief, the Seventh Amendment was inapplicable. Id. Chief Judge Meskill explained that the Seventh Amendment jury trial right applies to
legal but not equitable claims. Id. The distinction between legal
and equitable claims, the chiefjudge related, involves consideration of the nature of the remedy sought, and to a lesser extent,
the classification of the claim under 18th century English law. Id.
At common law, the chief judge observed, claims similar to
tortious interference were regarded as legal. Id. (citing In rejensen, 946 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir. 1991)). Chief Judge Meskill added that the presence of both legal and equitable claims in a
complaint will not destroy the right to a jury trial. Id. at 1329.
Referencing the antecedent determination that the trustee's complaint in essence asserted legal claims and not bankruptcy claims,
the court stated that the mere fact that the claims arose from equitable proceedings was insufficient to transform them into equitable claims. Id. The court reiterated that because the trustee's
action did not affect the claims allowance process, the action was
in essence legal. Id. The court therefore concluded that the Seventh Amendment was applicable. Id.
The chiefjudge proceeded to address CNB's contention that
the trustee waived the right to a jury trial by filing a voluntary
petition in bankruptcy. Id. CNB, the court imparted, argued that
because a creditor who files a proof of claim waives the right to a
jury trial, a debtor or a trustee similarly is stripped of the right to
a jury trial. Id. The court rejected this argument, and distinguished a prior case where a creditor was denied a jury trial. Id.
at 1330 (citing In re Hallahan, 936 F.2d 1496 (7th Cir. 1991)). In
Hallahan, the court noted, the dispute for which the debtor
sought a jury trial involved the nondischargeability of a debt, a
matter integral to the bankruptcy process. Id. The court concluded that waiver of the right to a jury trial would occur only
where the dispute involved the claims-allowance process or impacted on the equitable reordering of creditors' claims. Id. Even
under those circumstances, the court added, the jury trial right is
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lost not by waiver but rather because the legal claim has been
recast as an equitable issue. Id.
Finally, the court considered whether the public rights doctrine superseded the trustee's entitlement to a jury trial. Id. at
1331. Under this doctrine, the court observed, if a case involves
statutory rights integral to a public regulatory scheme, Congress
may refrain from providing a right to a jury trial when such case
has been assigned to a specialized equity court. Id. (citing
Granfinanciera,S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 55 n.10 (1989)).
After acknowledging this principle, ChiefJudge Meskill concluded that because the trustee's action in the present case
sounded in contract and tort and was not based on a statutory
right, the public rights doctrine was inapplicable. Id. The chief
judge explained that although the doctrine could be loosely interpreted as encompassing disputes merely involving public
rights, a party would not be divested of a right as fundamental as
the right to ajury trial unless the controversy was integrally connected to a public right. Id. Because the present controversy involved only private rights that did not impact on the bankruptcy
regulatory scheme, the court concluded that the public rights
doctrine did not strip the trustee of the right to ajury trial. Id. at
1331-32.
The court added that it would be improper for the trustee to
use the results of the jury trial on the contract and tort claims in
an equitable subordination proceeding against CNB under 11
U.S.C. § 510(c), and opined that such right had effectively been
waived. Id. at 1332. The court also noted that although the
question of whether a bankruptcy court could conduct a jury trial
was not directly raised, there existed no constitutional or statutory barrier to jury trials in bankruptcy courts. Id.
In dissent, Judge Oakes contended that the trustee's action
was intimately related to the bankruptcy proceedings. Id. at 1332
(Oakes, J., dissenting). Surveying the allegations in the underlying complaint, including alleged improper control of the debtor
during reorganization, threats to terminate chapter 11 financing,
and misuse of court-approved financing, the dissenting judge
characterized this conduct as integrally related to the chapter 11
proceedings. Id. at 1332-33 (Oakes, J., dissenting). Accordingly,
Judge Oakes asserted that because the underlying action was equitable and not legal, the trustee had no right to ajury trial. Id. at
1333 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
The dissent also raised the unresolved question of whether
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the bankruptcy court or the district court would conduct the jury
trial. Id. Judge Oakes remarked that a Second Circuit opinion
upholding the power of a bankruptcy court to conduct a jury trial
had been criticized by courts and commentators. Id. (citing In re
Ben Cooper, Inc., 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1990)). Furthermore, the
judge stated that because Congress had not expressly granted
bankruptcy judges the authority to conduct jury trials, and because such authority was not essential to the bankruptcy system,
such authority should not be implied. Id. (citation omitted).
Noting that this issue was not before the court, Judge Oakes
nonetheless averred that the court should have resolved the issue, given the case's already lengthy procedural history. Id. at
1334 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
In Germain v. Connecticut Nat. Bank, the Second Circuit made
clear that the right to ajury trial is not extinguished for all causes
of action arising from bankruptcy proceedings. The right to a
jury trial in certain suits at common law is a fundamental right
protected by the Seventh Amendment. Although Article I, section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to establish
laws regulating bankruptcy, this power must be considered in
conjunction with the mandates of the Seventh Amendment. Absent an explicit and unequivocal directive from Congress, the
right to a jury trial in an action arising from the bankruptcy milieu should not be abrogated. Accordingly, the Second Circuit
ruled that the right to a jury trial is preserved for tort and contract claims related to bankruptcy proceedings.
The holding of Germain is based largely on the court's conclusion that the trustee was asserting legal rather than equitable
claims. The court properly classified the tortious interference
and lender liability claims as legal claims, distinct from the equitable bankruptcy proceedings, and therefore providing a proper
basis for a jury trial. The court failed to acknowledge, however,
that CNB's threats to violate the automatic stay could themselves
be viewed as a violation of § 362(a)(3). This section of the Bankruptcy Code proscribes any attempt to exercise control over
property of the estate. Arguably, mere threats to terminate
postpetition financing, when used as leverage to dominate the
debtor's operations, constitute a violation of the automatic stay
within the plain language of § 362(a)(3). Nonetheless, the
trustee elected to seek a remedy for CNB's alleged misconduct by
asserting a legal claim, rather than seeking equitable relief. As
the court noted, the right to a jury trial is not destroyed by the
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existence of an equitable claim where legal claims exist. See id. at
1329. Accordingly, the court properly permitted the trustee to
preserve the right to a jury trial for claims that were essentially
legal, despite the possibility of relief in equity.
Dissenting Judge Oakes raised the intriguing and complex
questions of whether bankruptcy courts may conduct jury trials,
and under what circumstances. The substantial split of authority
on this issue demonstrates the widespread confusion in this area,
and suggests that due to the ambiguity of the bankruptcy jurisdictional provisions, tenable arguments can be made in support
of various conclusions.
Lurking beneath these questions is the larger issue of
whether bankruptcy courts ought to be authorized to conduct
jury trials. As noted above, valid arguments can be made as to
the authority of bankruptcy courts to hold jury trials; however,
the fact that bankruptcy courts may have the authority to hold
jury trials does not mean it is expedient for them to do so. Bankruptcy courts are specialized equity courts created by Congress
to supervise the reorganization and liquidation of insolvent debtors. Congress presumably intended these courts to perform a
narrowly circumscribed function. Given the present burden on
bankruptcy dockets and the dearth of judicial resources, it is
questionable whether existing bankruptcy court resources should
be allocated to conducting jury trials, especially at the expense of
services Congress intended the courts to provide.
Conversely, if adequate funding is made available, a greater
overall efficiency can be achieved by expressly granting bankruptcy courts authority to conduct jury trials in certain matters
arising from bankruptcy proceedings. This authority would likely
be limited to "core" proceedings, in light of the constitutional
constraints of Article III. See, e.g., Michaels v. Lomax (In re Skil-Aire
Corp.), 142 B.R. 692 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1992). Congress ultimately
must resolve this controversy, by clarifying the authority of bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials. If such authority is determined to be extensive, Congress must allocate sufficient
resources to enable the bankruptcy courts to execute these additional duties.
Scott Christopher Shelley
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BANKRUPTCY-GoOD CAUSE REJECTION UNDER II

§ 1113-UNION

U.S.C.

REJECTION OF MODIFICATIONS TO COLLEC-

TIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT CAN BE SUSTAINED

ONLY IF

MODIFICATIONS PLACE AN UNFAIR BURDEN OF REORGANIZATION ON UNION, WERE UNNECESSARY FOR DEBTOR'S REORGANIZATION, AND WERE MADE IN BAD FAITH-In

re Maxwell

Newspapers, Inc., doing business as Daily News, Debtor, 981 F.2d
85 (2d Cir. 1992).
On July 28, 1974, the New York Typographical Union No. 6
(Union) signed a collective bargaining agreement (Agreement)
with the New York Daily News (Paper) that guaranteed lifetime
employment to its members in exchange for the union's concession to not resist automation of the Paper's typesetting operation. 981 F.2d 85, 86-87. Almost twenty years later, and after
over $100 million dollars in losses within the final ten of those
years, the Paper filed for bankruptcy protection and reorganization. Id. at 87. Maxwell Newspapers, Inc. (Maxwell), the current
owner and debtor in bankruptcy, began negotiations for the sale
of the Paper's assets with the New DN Company owned by Mortimer Zuckerman (Zuckerman). Id. Because the sale of the assets
required Union approval, the Agreement became the focus of the
negotiations. Id.
Maxwell and Zuckerman negotiated as a team with the Union
and made an initial offer to modify the Agreement. The offer
stipulated that: (i) Zuckerman would not be obligated to employ
any Union members after the sale; (ii) if the sale to Zuckerman
did not occur, Maxwell would not be obligated to employ any
Union member in the event the Paper discontinued publication
or sold the Paper during the bankruptcy proceedings; and (iii)
any dispute regarding the latter two matters would be subject to
mandatory arbitration. Id. As support of this offer, Maxwell
proffered evidence that showed the terms of the Agreement prohibited past purchases of the Paper and that Maxwell could not
find anyone willing to purchase the Paper with such an Agreement in place. Id.
Two weeks later, the Union extended a counter-offer that included a provision that canceled the guarantee of lifetime employment for its members. Id. at 87-88. Additionally, the Union
proposed shift reduction for its members, a cash buy-out plan for
each member, contributions for three years to the pension and
welfare funds and an early retirement plan. Id. at 88. Maxwell
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submitted a counter-offer that accelerated the rate of shift reductions and modified the early retirement plan to add a so-called "5
+ 5 plan," which added five years to the age of a Union member
at retirement and five years to the time worked at the Paper. Id.
More importantly, Maxwell rejected the cash buyout and the
three yearly contributions to the pension and welfare plans. Id.
After another round of negotiations, on the night before the
hearing in bankruptcy court to decide Maxwell's motion to reject
the Agreement and to approve the sale to Zuckerman of the Paper, Zuckerman made a final offer. Id. Zuckerman's offer essentially restated Maxwell's original offer to the Union regarding the
shift reduction, but withdrew the 5 + 5 retirement plan. Id. As
to the Union's demand for contribution to the pension and welfare plan, Zuckerman offered one contribution of $1 million. Id.
The next day during oral argument before the bankruptcy court,
however, Zuckerman again offered the 5 + 5 plan. Id. The
Union rejected this final offer. Id.
Subsequently, the bankruptcy court granted Maxwell's motion pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1113 that sought rejection of the
Agreement. The bankruptcy court's order also approved Zuckerman's purchase of the assets that comprise the Paper, id. at 88-89
(citing 11 U.S.C. § 363), rejected the Union's request for an examiner, id. at 89 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b)), and found moot
the Union's request for arbitration. Id. The Union appealed to
the district court. Id.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York reversed the order granting Maxwell's motion for rejection of the Agreement but affirmed the remainder of the bankruptcy court's order. Id. The district court held that the Union
rejected Zuckerman's final offer for good cause because the
Union did not have an opportunity to consider and respond
before the bankruptcy hearing the following day. Id. The district
court found the bankruptcy court did not have the power to approve Maxwell's rejection of the Agreement because the Paper
did not meet all the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code; specifically, that the offer be made in good faith. Id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the district court's holding on the issue of Maxwell's request to reject the Agreement and affirmed as to the remainder
of the district court's holding. Id. at 90. Judge Cardamone determined that the circuit court would apply plenary review to the
holding of the district court. Id. at 89. Specifically, the appellate
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court reasoned that the de novo review applied to questions of
law under 11 U.S.C. § 1113 and the standard of clearly erroneous would apply to findings of fact. Id.
Judge Cardamone turned first to the purpose of § 1113 in a
court-supervised reorganization. Id. The purpose, the court
opined, was to prevent a debtor's use of the bankruptcy proceedings to cancel an otherwise valid collective bargaining agreement. Id. (citing In re Century Brass Products, Inc., 795 F.2d 265,
272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986)). The court reasoned that the statute sought to prevent employers from discharging their obligations under the collective bargaining
agreement by requiring employers to modify the agreement only
to the extent necessary for reorganization. Id. Judge Cardamone
stated that § 1113 permitted the bankruptcy court to reject a collective bargaining agreement to facilitate the sale of the assets.
Id. The appellate court concluded that the purpose of the statute
was to force all parties associated with a financially insolvent
business to share in the hardship of reorganization, even those
groups covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Id.
Recognizing that this statutory provision could be used to
abuse unions, Judge Cardamone found that rejection of a collective bargaining agreement could be allowed only if the debtor
met the standards articulated in § 11 13(b)(1). Id. (citing 11
U.S.C. § 1113 (b)(1)). The court concluded that the Union's refusal of Maxwell's offer to modify the Agreement was without
good cause and that equity required rejection by the bankruptcy
court of the entire Agreement. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(c)(1)(3)). The court found most compelling the statute's mandate
that the parties bargain in good faith. Id. (citing In re Royal Composing Room, Inc., 848 F.2d 345, 349 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1078 (1989)).
The court noted that under the bankruptcy court's interpretation of the statute, rejection would be permissible if the Union
was forced to make an inequitable contribution that was unnecessary to the reorganization. Id. Judge Cardamone discussed the
district court's reason for reversing the bankruptcy court on this
issue. Id. The Second Circuit agreed that the statute should be
read more broadly to include not only those factors the bankruptcy court considered but also to include the manner in which
Zuckerman made its final offer. Id. at 89-90. The court adopted
the district court's conclusion that the bankruptcy court's narrow
reading of the statute would result in the exclusion of the good
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cause requirement to be identical to the requirements for rejection. Id. at 89. The appellate court stated that the good cause
requirement for rejecting an offer under 11 U.S.C. § 1113 included both the substance of the offer and the manner in which it
was made to the other party. Id.
In applying the good cause requirement to this case, Judge
Cardamone again recognized that the bankruptcy court interpreted the statute too narrowly. Id. at 90. The appellate court
rejected, however, the district court's conclusion that the findings
of fact by the bankruptcy court were clearly erroneous on the issue of whether the Union's renunciation of Zuckerman's final offer was for good cause. Id. The court conceded that it would be
difficult to define good cause without the facts of a case. Id. To
guide the court, Judge Cardamone again turned to the underlying purpose of the statute. Id. Judge Cardamone posited that
the power of the bankruptcy court to reject the collective bargaining agreement encourages unions to bargain in good faith or
lose the deal completely. Id. Conversely, the union was protected from employer abuses by the requirement that the debtor
prove the modifications were necessary to the future financial viability of the reorganized business. Id.
The court opined that a union's rejection of an offer stating
only those modifications necessary to reorganization would be
without good cause. Id. Judge Cardamone reasoned that a
debtor's rejection of an union's offer meeting the needs of reorganization would similarly lack good cause. Id. The court thus
concluded that the bankruptcy court erred in interpreting the
good cause requirement under the statute. Id.
The appellate panel held, however, the findings of fact by
the bankruptcy court were sufficient to support an order rejecting
the Agreement. Id. Judge Cardamone found compelling the fact
that the Union's workforce declined only thirteen percent as
compared to the much larger declines in workforce borne by the
other unions, which ranged from a low of twenty-one percent to
a high of fifty-eight percent. Id. Additionally, the court rejected
the Union's claim that the concessions would unfairly burden the
Union. Id. As support for its conclusion, the court recalled that
the unsecured creditors and the equity stockholders received
nothing under the reorganization, and that neither Maxwell nor
Zuckerman could afford continuing the Paper under the terms of
the Agreement. Id. at 90-91. The court held neither of these
findings of fact were clearly erroneous. Id.
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Moreover, Judge Cardamone found unpersuasive the district
court's conclusion that the Zuckerman offer was made in such a
manner as to constitute bad faith. Id. The court posited that unions and management frequently negotiate frantically in the closing hours of a deadline, this being the case, ten hours was more
than enough time for the Union to respond to Zuckerman's final
offer. Id. Because the Union had enough time to respond, the
court affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding of fact. Id.
Finally, the appellate court addressed the three other issues
appealed by the Union. Id. First, Judge Cardamone found no
merit in the Union's claim that 11 U.S.C. § 1113 applied only to
promote the interests of the debtor and not a purchaser. Id. On
this point, the Second Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court
and district court that the Agreement could be rejected pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 1113 if rejection aided in reorganizing the Paper,
regardless of the ultimate owner. Id.
Next, Judge Cardamone rejected the Union's second request
to reverse the bankruptcy court's and district court's order finding that Zuckerman was a good faith purchaser. Id. The court
observed that the Union did not contest the validity of the sale of
assets permissible under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1), but claimed
Zuckerman did not act in good faith because of alleged improper
bonuses to the pressman's and driver's union to consummate the
sale. Id. The court found that the bankruptcy court did not err
in concluding that the bonuses were not improper. Id. The court
deferred to the bankruptcy court's finding of facts as dispositive
on this issue and all other issues raised by the Union. Id.
In conclusion, Judge Cardamone warned the parties to bargain in good faith. Id. at 91-92. The court conditioned the issuing of this judgment on the continuation of Zuckerman's offer at
the time of oral argument to provide for the 5 + 5 plan and another offer made after the hearing before the bankruptcy court.
Id. at 92.
In In re Maxwell Newspapers, the Second Circuit stated the
three requirements a bankruptcy court must meet before interfering with an otherwise valid collective bargaining agreement.
The appellate court correctly pointed out that the Bankruptcy
Code promotes the settling of these disputes by the parties to the
contract. The bankruptcy courts will intervene in the negotiations only if an impost results preventing the reorganization of
the debtor. By interpreting the statute to include a requirement
of good faith in the manner in which the offer is made, the court
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sought to prevent the bankruptcy courts from rejecting a collective bargaining agreement because one party waits to the last
minute to submit an offer that is substantively fair and necessary,
but impossible to accept.
Additionally, the Second Circuit was mindful that the primary purpose of the Bankruptcy Code was to save the debtor at
the expense of the legal rights of other parties associated with the
debtor. Section 1113 furthers this purpose by discharging the
debtors obligations under a collective bargaining agreement.
Judge Cardomone analogized the current condition of the Daily
News to a naval ship struck by a torpedo and in danger of sinking. The ship is damaged but salvage results in the sacrifice of
those crew members that are trapped on the flooding side of the
bulkhead door. Here, the Union found itself on the flooding side
of the bulkhead door and only time will tell if the Daily News can
be salvaged.
Richard Brightman
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BUT THE LACK OF Ex-

PLICIT OR IMPLIED AUTHORITY FROM CONGRESS INDICATES
THAT BANKRUPTCY COURTS ARE NOT EMPOWERED To CON-

DUCT JURY TRIALS-Billing v. Ravin, Greenberg & Zackin,

150

B.R. 563 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1993).

Plaintiffs commenced an action in the United States District
Court, District of New Jersey, alleging they received substandard
representation during the course of their chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceeding from the defendant law firm, its successor, Ravin
Greenberg & Zackin, P.A., and Howard Greenberg, a member of
both firms. 150 B.R. 563, 563-64. When the complaint was filed,

defendants were attempting to collect $199,043.50 in fees from
plaintiffs in a bankruptcy court proceeding. Id. at 564. Plaintiffs'

malpractice claim arose under United States Code, title 11, therefore, the district court obtained jurisdiction over the claim via 28

U.S.C. § 1334.
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Defendants thereafter moved for alternative relief, seeking
either a dismissal of plaintiffs' claim, a stay pending the resolution of the fee dispute, abstention by the district court, or referral
of the matter to the bankruptcy court. In opposition, plaintiffs
argued that their malpractice claim is entitled to trial by jury and
must remain before the district court because bankruptcy courts
are not empowered to conduct jury trials. In addition, plaintiffs
asserted that even if malpractice claims did constitute core proceedings, there is no clear authority that bankruptcy courts are
ever empowered to conduct jury trials. Id.
Judge Barry rejected plaintiffs' contention that the malpractice claim was a non-core bankruptcy proceeding and held that
both common sense and an analysis of core/non-core precedent
indicate that plaintiffs' malpractice claim arising out of defendants' purported substandard representation in a chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding is a core proceeding. Id. at 566-67.
Nonetheless, Judge Barry denied defendants' motion, aligning
the court with those jurisdictions finding that bankruptcy courts
cannot conduct jury trials and holding that the lack of either explicit or implied authority from Congress warrants a finding that
bankruptcy courts cannot conduct jury trials even in "core" proceedings. Id. at 569-70.
The judge began the analysis by examining the underpinnings of the distinction between core and non-core bankruptcy
proceedings. Id. at 565. According to Judge Barry, the distinction stems from bankruptcy courts' limited scope of judicial
power. Id. Although bankruptcy courts were originally given jurisdiction in all cases arising under or related to cases under title
11, Judge Barry explained that this jurisdictional grant was eventually found unconstitutional. Id. (citing Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)). The
judge emphasized the Marathon Court's ruling that bankruptcy
courts are empowered to issue final judgments only in cases that
arise within the core of Congressionally granted power. Id. (citation omitted).
Next, Judge Barry observed that the core/non-core distinction was codified in 1984 in the amended Bankruptcy Code. Id.
According to the judge, the Code grants bankruptcy courts full
adjudicative power over core bankruptcy proceedings and provides a non-exclusive list of cases deemed core proceedings. Id.
The judge noted that this list contains two "catch-all" provisions
which vest bankruptcy courts with expansive jurisdiction with re-
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spect to matters concerning the administration of bankruptcy estates and debtor-creditor relations. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(A), (0)). With regard to non-core matters, Judge Barry
explained that bankruptcy courts must submit proposed findings
of fact and conclusions of law to district courts for de novo review. Id.
Against this backdrop, Judge Barry addressed plaintiffs' argument that their malpractice claim was a non-core bankruptcy
proceeding and therefore incapable of adjudication in bankruptcy court. Id. at 564. Acknowledging that courts have split
with regard to the manner in which core/non-core distinctions
are established, the court launched into a detailed analysis of
courts' differing approaches to the problem. Id. at 565-67. First,
Judge Barry noted that some courts narrowly interpret the two
catch-all provisions, and rule that claims arising outside of specific categories of core proceedings of section 157 are "related
proceedings," and unamenable to determination by a bankruptcy
court, even though the claim may arguably fall within the rubric
of § 157's "catch-all" provisions. Id. at 565 (citing In re Castlerock
Properties, 781 F.2d 159, 162 (9th Cir. 1986)). Alternatively, the
judge explained, other courts have rejected the Ninth Circuit's
view, preferring instead to interpret Congress's intent in enacting the 1984 amendment, and finding that core proceedings
must be broadly read, "close to or congruent with constitutional
limits." Id. at 565-66 (quoting In re Arnold Print Works, Inc., 815
F.2d 165, 168 (1st Cir. 1987)).
Beyond these diametrically opposed views, Judge Barry
pointed out, lies the Second Circuit's test, followed in New
Jersey, wherein courts examine whether a claim arose pre- or
post-petition, usually finding that a post-petition claim is a core
proceeding. Id. at 566 (citing In re Ben Cooper, Inc., 896 F.2d
1394, 1400 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 425 (1990),
reinstated, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2041
(1991); Davis v. Merv Grifin Co., 128 B.R. 78, 90-91 (D.N.J. 1991)).
Finally, the judge explained that the Fifth Circuit's test deems a
proceeding as core if it implicates a substantive right arising
under title 11 or the claim is one that could arise only within the
context of a bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 566 (citing In re Wood,
825 F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir. 1987)).
Turning to plaintiffs' argument, Judge Barry determined
that the malpractice claim was a core proceeding. Id. As a preliminary matter, the judge reasoned that plaintiffs' malpractice

19931

SURVEY

1927

claim should fall within § 157(b)(2)(A)'s catch-all provision
deeming matters concerning the administration of bankruptcy
estates to be core proceedings. Id. (citation omitted). Observing
that plaintiffs' claim was at the center of the bankruptcy process,
Judge Barry rejected the Ninth Circuit's view of the Code's catchall provisions and remarked that a judicial failure to furnish the
provisions with any meaning would render Congress's inclusion
of the provisions "mere surplassage." Id. (citation omitted).
Consequently, Judge Barry ruled that § 157(b)(2)(A) includes
claims that a debtor's attorney negligently handled a bankruptcy
proceeding. Id.
Judge Barry buttressed this conclusion by illustrating that
plaintiffs' claim is a core proceeding even if other courts' tests are
used. Id. First, the judge observed that plaintiffs' claim arose
post-petition and therefore constituted a "core proceeding" in
those jurisdictions that emphasize the timing of a claim in determining its nature. Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, Judge
Barry asserted that the allegations supporting plaintiffs' malpractice claims arose entirely within the context of a bankruptcy proceeding. Id. Because the bankruptcy proceeding was a sine qua
non of plaintiffs' malpractice action, the judge explained, it satisfies the Fifth Circuit's test. Id. (citation omitted).
Finally, Judge Barry explained that "common sense and
practicalities" warrant the conclusion that debtors' malpractice
claim is a core matter. Id. Reasoning that other courts examine
the nature of an underlying claim to determine whether the proceeding should be deemed core for purposes of adjudication in a
bankruptcy court, the court ruled that the nature of plaintiffs'
claim and its relation to bankruptcy courts' basic functions warranted the conclusion that plaintiffs' claim constituted a "core
proceeding." Id. at 566-77.
Having so determined, Judge Barry focused upon plaintiffs'
right to a jury trial. Id. This analysis was necessitated, the judge
explained, by the United States Supreme Court's ruling that the
Seventh Amendment's guarantee of trial by jury is limited to controversies involving legal, as opposed to equitable, rights or remedies. Id. (citing Granfinanciera,S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41

(1989)). Adhering to this principle, Judge Barry commenced a
brief analysis of whether plaintiffs' claims required a jury trial. Id.
Guided by the Granfinanciera Court's three-pronged test for
determining whether a claim is entitled to a jury trial, the judge
compared plaintiffs' malpractice claim to claims brought at com-
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mon law and examined the nature of plaintiffs' requested remedy. Id. (citation omitted). The judge quickly concluded that
plaintiffs' claims were legal in nature, reasoning that plaintiffs'
malpractice claim would have been subject to trial by jury at common law. Id. (citations omitted). In addition, the judge concluded that plaintiffs' proposed money damages were legal in
nature. Id. (citing Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1402). In accord with
this conclusion, Judge Barry rejected defendants' argument that
plaintiffs' prayer for money damages was merely a restatement of
fee objections pending before the bankruptcy court. Id. Plaintiffs' money damages could potentially reach much further than
the resolution of the fee controversy, the judge explained, thus
rendering defendants' argument unpersuasive. Id. Accordingly,
Judge Barry ruled that plaintiffs were entitled to a trial by jury for
their malpractice claims. Id. at 567-68.
Nonetheless, Judge Barry asserted, the third prong of the
Granfinancieratest required the court to determine whether the
bankruptcy court is empowered to conduct jury trials. Id. at 568
(citation omitted). Noting that the Supreme Court has not ruled
on the issue, the judge acknowledged the split among the circuits
with regard to the issue of jury trials in bankruptcy courts. Id.
Commenting upon this split, Judge Barry recognized Congress's
silence on the issue. Id. (citations omitted). The judge then explained any authority for bankruptcy court jury trials must be
gleaned from Congress's enactments in the bankruptcy arena.
Id. (citation omitted).
Judge Barry's analysis initially focused upon decisions from
the Second Circuit and the District of New Jersey, both jurisdictions having found implied authority for bankruptcy court jury
trials. Id. According to the judge, the Second Circuit found an
implied congressional authorization for jury trials by comparing
the Granfinanciera Court's ruling that legal claims are entitled to
trial by jury with congressional enactments broadly authorizing
bankruptcy judges to exert authority and decide "cases under title 11, core proceedings that arise under title 11, or arising in
cases under title 11." Id. (Citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157(b), Ben
Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1402). Judge Barry explained that the Second
Circuit's analysis led the court to conclude that litigants' rights to
trial by jury did not alter Congress's intent that core matters be
adjudicated in bankruptcy court. Id. Permitting jury trials in
bankruptcy court, Judge Barry noted, was the only way the Sec-
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ond Circuit could reconcile the various concerns embodied in its
comparison. Id.
Additionally, Judge Barry observed that the District of New
Jersey utilized a historical approach in finding an implied congressional authorization for bankruptcy court jury trials. Id. (citing Dailey, 76 B.R. at 967). The judge stated that the Dailey court
examined bankruptcy courts' shifting bases of congressionally
granted authority and concluded that Congress's failure to include the Emergency Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure's prohibition on jury trials within the Federal Judgeship Act of 1984
indicated that Congress did not intend to abrogate bankruptcy
courts' authority to empanel juries. Id. at 568-69. Moreover,
Judge Barry explained, the Dailey court observed that the
Supreme Court had promulgated Bankruptcy Rule 9015, restoring bankruptcy court jury trials, prior to Congress's passage of
the 1984 Federal Judgeship Act. Id. at 569 (citation omitted).
According to Judge Barry, the Dailey court believed that Congress's inaction strengthened the position that Congress would
have explicitly prohibited bankruptcy court jury trials if that was
its intent. Id. (citations omitted).
Judge Barry next scrutinized decisions contrary to the Second Circuit and the District of New Jersey. Id. The judge noted
the Eighth Circuit's ruling that the power to conduct jury trials is
not an indispensable part of the authority actually conferred by
Congress, which, in the Eighth Circuit's view, is a precondition to
finding any implied power from congressional enactments. Id.
(citing In re United Missouri Bank, N.A., 901 F.2d 1449, 1456 (8th
Cir. 1990)). Furthermore, Judge Barry observed, the Eighth Circuit found that the 1984 Federal Judgeship Act's vague legislative
history was a manifestation of congressional approval for the
Emergency Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and thus supports the
inference that Congress intended to continue the Emergency
Rules' prohibition of jury trials. Id. (citation omitted).
Judge Barry next explained that the Tenth Circuit emphasized that the 1984 Federal Judgeship Act did not contain a section that corresponded with a provision of the 1978 Bankruptcy
Reform Act vesting bankruptcy courts with "the powers of a
court of equity, law and admiralty." Id. (citing In re Kaiser Steel
Corp., 911 F.2d 380, 391 (10th Cir. 1990); quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1481 (repealed)). The judge reported the Tenth Circuit's observation that § 157(b)(1), which grants bankruptcy judges personal power to "hear and determine" core matters, does not,
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however, authorize bankruptcy judges to delegate this power to a
jury. Id. (citation omitted).
Finally, Judge Barry observed that the Seventh Circuit compared bankruptcy judges' and federal magistrates' statutory bases
of authority and emphasized that unlike magistrates' statutory
empowerment, bankruptcy judges' statutory grants of power fail
to mention any authority to conduct jury trials. Id. (citing In re
Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152, 1155-56 (7th Cir. 1992)). In addition, Judge Barry explained the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that
any attempt to find an implied congressional authorization for
bankruptcy court jury trials would amount to an "illusory
search." Id. The Seventh Circuit's analysis led it to conclude,
Judge Barry noted, that bankruptcy courts cannot conduct jury
trials. Id. (citation omitted).
Judge Barry concluded the opinion by adopting the analyses
conducted by courts finding that bankruptcy courts are not empowered to conduct jury trials. Id. at 569-70. The judge added,
however, that Congress's failure to explicitly empower bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials, when combined with the
"tenuous and equivocal nature" of arguments supporting a finding of an implied congressional authority, precipitated the conclusion that Congress has not empowered bankruptcy courts to
preside over jury trials. Id. at 570. Thus, Judge Barry denied
defendants' motion. Id. at 570 & n.2.
Judge Barry's decision is notable for its solid analysis of
core/non-core bankruptcy law and its attempt to clarify the confusing issue of whether bankruptcy courts are empowered to conduct jury trials. Thejudge's straightforward analysis set forth the
two lines of divergent authority with respect to the jury trial issue
and provided a principled basis upon which to conclude that
bankruptcy courts cannot preside over jury trials. Because the
opinion sets forth and balances the two lines of authority, the
decision is a welcome addition to an area of bankruptcy law that
is in a "state of disarray." Dailey, 76 B.R. at 966 (citation
omitted).
On another level, however, Judge Barry's opinion fails for its
lack of independent analysis and resulting unpersuasiveness.
Although the judge explained other courts' decisions and eventually sided with one line of authority, Judge Barry failed to articulate any meaningful and independently deduced reasons
supporting the proposition that bankruptcy courts cannot conduct jury trials. Moreover, Judge Barry overlooked bankruptcy
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courts' decisions in the District of New Jersey that have persuasively distinguished some of the decisions upon which the judge's
ultimate conclusion is based. See In re Skil-Aire Corp, 142 B.R. 692,
696 (distinguishing In re United Missouri Bank, 901 F.2d 1449 (8th
Cir. 1990), by finding that the decision rests upon a faulty premise). Because bankruptcy courts are not bound by district court
decisions, Judge Barry's opinion provides little guidance for the
bankruptcy bar, especially in New Jersey.
Thus, even though Judge Barry added some gloss and attempted to re-orient the confusing issue of whether bankruptcy
courts may conduct jury trials, it appears that the decision will
have little impact upon the development of the bankruptcy court
jury trial issue. This anticipated consequence leads to the ultimate conclusion that the issue requires review by the Third Circuit or the United States Supreme Court.
James E. Tonrey Jr.

BANKRUPTCY-INSURANCE

PROCEEDS-PROCEEDS

OF

CREDIT

LIFE INSURANCE POLICY ARE PROPERTY OF CREDITOR BENEFICIARY POLIcY-First Fidelity Bank v. McAteer, 985 F.2d 114 (3d

Cir. 1993).
Raymond McAteer purchased a truck through a retail installment contract assigned to First Fidelity Bank (FFB). 985 F.2d at
116. According to the contract, Mr. McAteer owed FFB a total of
$14,195.40. He purchased a credit life insurance policy as security for the loan, naming FFB as the primary beneficiary and his
estate as the secondary beneficiary. The policy required the insurer to pay Mr. McAteer's remaining debt in the event of his

death, including up to two months arrearage, with any excess going to his estate.
In March, 1989, Mr. McAteer and his wife filed a joint petition for chapter 13 bankruptcy. Under the confirmed plan, to
which FFB agreed, FFB's claim of $13,722.22 was "crammed
down" to the truck's market value -

$7525.00

-

plus ten per-

cent of the unsecured balance of the loan. Less than a year after
the plan was confirmed, Mr. McAteer died, and the insurance
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company paid FFB the amount due on the date of death according to the insurance policy, and not the confirmed plan.
Mrs. McAteer moved to compel FFB to turn the amount paid
in excess of the confirmed plan over to her husband's estate. Id.
at 116. Judge Gindin of the bankruptcy court found in favor of
Mrs. McAteer, holding that FFB was owed the amount due under
the confirmed plan, not the insurance policy. Id. (citing Matter of
McAteer, 130 B.R. 726, 728-29 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1991)).
Relying on an unpublished opinion with almost identical
facts, the bankruptcy judge agreed that creditors are bound by
confirmed plans. Id. The judge reasoned that fairness was a significant consideration because the bankruptcy court is a court of
equity. Id. Judge Gindin further reasoned that FFB would unjustly receive a windfall if allowed to keep the proceeds in excess
of the plan. Id. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy
court's ruling. Id.
Reversing the district court, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that FFB was entitled to all proceeds of the
credit insurance policy notwithstanding the confirmed plan. Id.
at 118-19.
Judge Bartle, writing for the panel, began by noting that the
actual insurance policy was the property of the estate. Id. at 116.
The court further noted, however, that ownership of such a policy did not entail ownership of the proceeds of that policy. Id. at
117. An individual may purchase a policy and name any third
party the beneficiary, the judge explained, and the beneficiary becomes entitled to the policy's proceeds upon the owner's death.
Id.
The court further clarified that the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not create an interest in the proceeds of an insurance
policy where such an interest did not previously exist. Id. Judge
Bartle then articulated the principle that an estate in bankruptcy
includes only property in which the debtor, if solvent, would have
had an interest. Id.
The judge asserted that the issue before the court was
whether the amount payable to FFB for Mr. McAteer's debt was
the amount due under the installment contract, or the lesser
amount under the confirmed plan. Id. The court next set forth
FFB's McAteer's contention that a confirmed plan binds both the
debtor and each creditor thus altering the amount due under the
insurance policy. Id. at 117-18.
Judge Bartle rejected this argument based on the principle
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that while a confirmed plan binds a debtor and all creditors with
regard to the debtor, bankruptcy status does not alter a creditor's
right to collect from third parties. Id. at 118. The court agreed
with the Seventh Circuit's assertion that since a debtor's discharge in bankruptcy arises not by consent of the creditors, but
by operation of federal law, a creditor's approval of a confirmed
plan cannot be read as consenting to alterations of obligations
outside of the bankruptcy proceedings. Id. (citing Union Carbide
Corp. v. Newbowles, 686 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1982)).
The court elaborated by asserting that a debtor's discharge
from liability under bankruptcy has no effect upon the obligations of the debtor's insurers. Id. As support, Judge Bartle
pointed out that courts have allowed plaintiffs to sue debtors in
tort to collect from the debtor's liability insurer. Id.
The court was especially persuaded by a case in which a
debtor chartered a barge, and purchased an insurance policy as
security, naming the barge owner as loss payee. Id. (citing In re
Offshore Carrier& Liner Services, Inc., 82 B.R. 504 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
1988)). The Offshore court held that because the barge owner was
the beneficiary of the policy, the debtor was only entitled to the
proceeds left after the barge owner had received the agreed value
of the barge. Id. Judge Bartle stated that neither bankruptcy nor
equity will operate to reduce the value of the owner's interest in
the insured property to its fair market value. Id. (quoting Offshore,
82 B.R. at 506).
The court concluded by recalling that Mr. McAteer merely
owned the insurance policy, while FFB was the primary beneficiary. Id. FFB's interest in the proceeds of the policy was not the
property of Mr. McAteer's estate, the judge asserted, and thus
could not be altered by the confirmed plan. Id. 118-19. The
court reasoned that while Mr. McAteer's bankruptcy discharge altered FFB's right to collect from Mr. McAteer or his estate, it did
not alter FFB's right to collect from the insurers, because FFB
was a third party beneficiary. Id. at 119. Accordingly, the court
held that the confirmation of the chapter 13 plan reducing Mr.
McAteer's indebtedness on a retail installment contract did not
alter FFB's right to recover more than the "cram down" amount
as the third party beneficiary of the credit life insurance policy.
Id.
By leaving the terms of the insurance policy intact, the court
properly retained the intended scope of a bankruptcy discharge
by limiting debt reduction to that owed directly by the debtor, as
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opposed to a guarantor or insurer. To hold otherwise would undermine the purpose of bankruptcy, which is to discharge the
debtor's liability only - not the liability of parties merely connected to the debtor.
Moreover, the court's decision will preserve the purpose of
debt insurance in a society dependent upon the use of credit.
There is always some risk involved when a creditor extends a
loan to a debtor, and some loans simply are more risky than
others. Therefore, creditors must be availed with certain options
that ensure repayment, regardless of the financial status of the
debtor and notwithstanding whether the creditor chooses to take
advantage of such options. This case aptly illustrates that a
debtor's purchase of a life insurance policy, naming the creditor
as beneficiary as security for a loan, will guarantee repayment to
the creditor no matter what happens to the debtor.
Jennifer L. Heeb

BANKRUPTCY-DISCHARGEABILITY
BANKRUPTCY

CODE

OF EDUCATIONAL

PROVISION

WHICH

LOANS-

LIMITS

Dis-

CHARGEABILITY OF EDUCATIONAL LOANS APPLIES TO NON-STUDENT CO-OBLIGOR OF THE

LOAN-In re Pelkowski,

990 F.2d

737 (3d Cir. 1993).
Virginia Pelkowski signed six notes as co-maker and a seventh note as sole maker for loans used toward the cost of her
childrens' education. 990 F.2d at 738. Each note was guaranteed by the Ohio Student Loan Commission. Pelkowski subsequently filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and
sought to discharge the six notes in which she was co-obligor.
Examining § 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, which prohibits
the discharge of any educational debt guaranteed by a governmental unit, the bankruptcy court held that § 523(a)(8) was inapplicable to non-student co-obligors of notes for student loans.
Id. at 739 (citing In re Boylen, 29 B.R. 924 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1983)). Accordingly, the bankruptcy court ordered Pelkowski's
loan debts discharged. Id.
On appeal, the district court chose to follow the more recent
decisions of a majority of bankruptcy courts, which have deter-
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mined that § 523(a)(8) precluded the discharge by non-student
co-obligors of educational debt. Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, the district court noted the parties' stipulation that Pelkowski could prove neither of the two statutory exceptions to
§ 523(a)(8). Id. Therefore, the court held the six educational
loans nondischargeable.
Pelkowski appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit. Id. Applying a plenary standard of review,
the Third Circuit reviewed the case in order to determine
whether § 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code applied to a nonstudent co-signer of a government guaranteed educational loan.
Id. Rejecting arguments that the debtor's status as a non-student
co-obligor renders § 523(a)(8) inapplicable, the court held that,
absent one of the statutory exceptions, guaranteed educational
loans are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Id. at 745.
Writing for the appellate panel, Judge Sloviter began by reviewing the Guaranteed Student Loan Program. Id. at 739.
Judge Sloviter explained that the program's purpose is to provide low interest loans to college students. Id. (citing S. REP. No.
673, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4027, 4030). Under the program, the judge continued, various
institutional lenders are able to provide educational loans which
are insured by the United States Department of Education. Id.
(citations omitted). In the event of default due to death, disability, or discharge in bankruptcy, Judge Sloviter explained, the federal government reimburses the original lender. Id. at 740.
Judge Sloviter observed that while educational loans backed by
the government were dischargeable in bankruptcy prior to 1978,
the promulgation of § 523(a)(8) had since placed a substantial
restriction on the dischargeability of those debts. Id.
After exploring the loan program, the court of appeals then
briefly reviewed the parties' stipulations. Id. The stipulations
made by the parties, the court observed, included: (i) that the
loans were backed by a "governmental unit" for the purpose of
§ 523(a)(8); (ii) that the loans had not become due over five years
prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition; and (iii) that the
failure to discharge the six loans would not impose an undue
hardship upon Pelkowski. Id. Because these stipulations precluded application of the exceptions to § 523(a)(8), the court of
appeals stated that the sole issue remaining was whether a nonstudent co-obligor debt is encompassed within the non-dischargeability of § 523(a)(8). Id.
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Judge Sloviter recognized the position, taken by several
courts, that a debt is an "educational loan" only if the signatory
utilizes the proceeds for her own education. Id. (citing In re
Washington, 41 B.R. 211, 214 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984)). The court,
however, found no evidence in the language of the statute to support such a distinction. Id. at 741. Examining the plain language
of § 523(a)(8), Judge Sloviter observed that the Bankruptcy Code
made no reference to a "student debtor." Id. Instead, the court
stated, the section provided that "any debt" for an educational
loan which was incurred by an "individual debtor" is subject to
restrictions on dischargeability. Id. The court, following the
weight of authority among bankruptcy courts, concluded that
§ 523(a)(8) applied with equal force to the debtor whether as a
student or a non-student. Id. (citations omitted).
The Third Circuit next addressed Pelkowski's principal argument that § 523(a)(8) did not apply to a co-signer of an educational loan. Id. The court acknowledged Pelkowski's assertion
that co-obligors are not expressly mentioned in the statute but
refused to treat that omission as an ambiguity. Id. at 741-42. Instead, the court interpreted the statute to include co-obligors in
the absence of express statutory language to the contrary. Id. at
742. The court noted that Pelkowski sought to seize upon the
statute's mention of an "individual" debtor to support the proposition that § 523(a)(8) applied only to notes made by a single
obligor. Id. The Third Circuit, however, summarily rejected this
argument and adopted the view that Congress merely sought to
distinguish between "individual" and "corporate" debtors. Id.
(citing Garrie v. James L. Gray, Inc., 912 F.2d 808, 812 (5th Cir.
1990)).
Judge Sloviter bolstered the court's holding by examining
the legislative history of § 523(a)(8). Id. Judge Sloviter asserted
that during the early 1970's legislators and the public became
concerned that former students were abusing the Educational
Loan Program by filing for bankruptcy just before beginning
profitable careers. Id. (citations omitted). The judge reviewed
the statements of two members of Congress who had expressed
concern over the alarming increase in the number of student
loan defaults due to bankruptcy. Id. at 742-43 (citations omitted). Judge Sloviter cited these comments as evidencing Congress's dual objectives of maintaining the financial integrity of
the Student Loan Program, and curtailing the ability of student
debtors to unfairly exploit the program. Id. at 743 (citing 124
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1791-98; H.R. REP. No. 595, at 132-62, reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6093-123).
Having identified the two main concerns of Congress, the
court rejected Pelkowski's position that Congress's specific intent
to curb abuse of the loan program by students who file for bankruptcy while on the verge of lucrative careers renders § 523(a)(8)
inapplicable to middle-age, co-obligor parents. Id. Given the
concern for the financial integrity of the loan program, the court
stated that all obligors, whether students or middle-age parents,
were logically within the scope of the section. Id. In addition,
the court rejected the contention that because there were relatively few co-signers when the statute was enacted, Congress had
no intent to restrict the dischargeability of loans as to those debtors. Id.
Judge Sloviter recognized that Pelkowski's arguments found
support in the reasoning of several bankruptcy courts. Id. Nonetheless, the court refused to adopt that reasoning. Id. (citations
omitted). The court observed that even if co-signers were not
specifically targeted to fall within the ambit of the statute, " 'Congress cannot be expected to specifically address each issue of
statutory construction which may arise.' " Id. at 743-44 (quoting
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 341 (1981)). The court asserted that the statute has been amended several times, each time
expanding the limitations on dischargeability of educational
loans. Id. at 743. The court explained that any default of a student loan, regardless of the debtor's status, would run counter to
Congress's intent to protect the program from financial disaster.
Id. Judge Sloviter therefore concluded that the overall policy of
§ 523(a)(8) can be achieved only be prohibiting dischargeability.
Id. at 744 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the court held that an
individual who co-signs an educational loan for another is subject
to the limitations set forth in § 523(a)(8), and ordered Pelkowski's debts non-dischargeable. Id. at 745.
In Pelkowski, the Third Circuit confronted a myriad of arguments and an assemblage of case law which contradicted its holding. As the first circuit court to address this issue, however, the
Third Circuit assumed a leadership role and properly concluded
that § 523(a)(8) applies to all educational loans backed by a governmental unit, regardless of the debtor's status. Any other
holding would contravene Congress's intent to prevent abuse of
the student loan program and to preserve its financial integrity.
Nevertheless, the court's holding was a close call. Even by
CONG. REC.
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the court's account of the statute's legislative history, it seems
unlikely that Congress ever contemplated ensnaring debtors like
Pelkowski in the web of § 523(a)(8). Judge Sloviter admitted that
even if Pelkowski were able to discharge the debt, the student cosigners would remain liable. By holding the debt non-dischargeable, the Third Circuit, unlike some bankruptcy courts, refused
to assume that keeping the student debtor "on the hook" was
sufficient to satisfy the statute vis-a-vis congressional intent. Absent an amendment removing the ambiguity in the statute, other
circuit courts will likely be obliged to tread on this fine line between interpretation and legislation. The Third Circuit's reasoning, while not rock solid, will undoubtedly carry considerable
weight in future litigation concerning § 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Joseph P. Clemente

BANKRUPTCY-REORGANIZATION

AND

CLASSIFICATION

OF

CLAIMS-DEBTOR FILING FOR BANKRUPTCY UNDER CHAPTER

1 I OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE MUST HAVE A REASONABLE BASIS FOR CLASSIFYING SIMILAR CLAIMS IN SEPARATE CLASSES-

John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Rt. 37 Business Park Assoc.,
987 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1993).
In 1989, Route 37 Business Park Associates ("debtor"), a
three-person partnership operating an industrial and commercial
park in Toms River, New Jersey, obtained a $5,700,000 loan to
refinance the park. 987 F.2d at 155. The loan was made by John
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company ("Hancock") and secured by a non-recourse first mortgage on the property, the partnership's main asset. In November, 1990, after the debtor failed
to make interest and tax payments, Hancock began foreclosure
proceedings. Pursuant to state law, a creditor may foreclose as of
right where a mortgage on the property is non-recourse. Id. at
155 n. 1 (citing Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Hocroft Assocs., 606 A.2d 1150,
1152 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1992)).
Shortly thereafter, the debtor sought to stay the foreclosure
proceedings by filing a petition under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 155. In March, 1991, Hancock countered by
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moving for relief from the stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) and
(2) (1988). Hancock's claim under § 362(d)(1), alleging inadequate protection of a creditor's interest in the property, was rejected by both the bankruptcy and district courts and not
considered on appeal by the Third Circuit. Rather, the gravamen
of the Third Circuit's analysis was focused on Hancock's claim
under § 362(d)(2). This section compels a bankruptcy court to
retard an automatic stay where a debtor has no equity in the
property and such "property is not necessary to an effective reorganization." Id. at 155-56 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 362 (d)(2)). The
debtor conceded they lacked equity in the park, thus the issue
before the court was whether the property was "necessary to an
effective reorganization." Id. at 156.
According to the debtor's disclosure statement, Hancock's
debt totaled $5.9 million and the liquidation value of the property was estimated at $2.2 million. The debtor proposed a plan
of reorganization which classified all creditors' claims into three
pertinent groups. Class Two represented the secured portion of
Hancock's claim ($2.2 million). Class Four consisted of Hancock's unsecured deficiency claim of $3.7 million. Class Three
included all other unsecured claims, totalling approximately
$492,000. Unless Hancock opted to treat its entire claim as secured and receive deferred cash payments, the plan alternatively
called for the same payment schedule for Class Three and Four
claims. Furthermore, it was required that the reorganization plan
be executed by a newly-formed limited partnership, "Newco."
Hancock objected to the division of unsecured claims into multiple classes and the granting of equity interests in Newco to the
general and limited partners.
In July and August, 1991, the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of New Jersey ruled in favor of confirming
the reorganization plan despite both of Hancock's charges. Specifically, the bankruptcy court noted the "new value exception"
to the Hancock's absolute priority argument set out in 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). Hancock had asserted that its claims were
wrongfully being subordinated to those of the debtor's partners,
who, as limited partners in Newco, retained equity interests in
Newco.
The district court affirmed on appeal. Id. It observed, however, that the classification scheme appeared to mask the debtor's
true initiative, namely, contravening the requirements of 11
U.S.C. § 1129(10). Id. at 156-57. The district court also upheld
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the "new value exception," although it expressed doubt that the
reorganization plan would pass muster at a confirmation hearing.
Id. at 157.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed, holding that the debtor's proposed reorganization plan included an impermissible classification scheme. Id. at
155. Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Alito concluded that
the Bankruptcy Code did not purport to allow debtors complete
latitude in classifying substantially similar claims in different categories. Id. at 157. Furthermore, in a "cram down" case, "each
class must represent a voting interest that is sufficiently distinct and
weighty to merit a separate voice in the decision whether the proposed reorganization should proceed." Id. at 159 (emphasis
added).
The court was suspicious of the debtor's true motives in separating the classes of unsecured creditors. Id. at 158. According
to § 1129(a), a debtor may utilize the "cram down" method to
confirm a reorganization plan by obtaining the approval of one
impaired class. Id. Furthermore, although the Code expressly
forbids placing claims that are not substantially similar in the
same class, it is silent on the practice of placing claims that are
substantially similar in different classes. Id. Thus, it may benefit
a debtor to create a separate impaired class which is likely to lend
its approval to a classification scheme which fails to represent the
legitimate sentiments of the overwhelming majority of creditors.
Id.
Recognizing the potential abuse of creditors that could result, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals added a reasonableness
requirement to the classification mix in Matter ofJersey City Medical
Ctr. Id. (citingJersey City Medical Ctr., 817 F.2d 1055, 1061 (3d
Cir. 1987)). In Jersey City Medical Ctr., the court posited that
"[t]here must be some limit on a debtor's power to classify creditors.... The potential for abuse would be significant otherwise."

Id. (quotingJersey City Medical Ctr., 817 F.2d at 1061). Although
the court did not emerge from Jersey City Medical Ctr. with clear
standards to determine the reasonableness of a classification
scheme, the John Hancock court gave considerable weight to the
dual purposes of classification under the Code: voting to confirm
a reorganization and attending to claims under the plan. Id. at
159 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(8), (10), and 11 U.S.C.
§ 1123(4)). Accordingly, Judge Alito proffered that the debtor's
purpose in creating separate classes was to compel a favorable
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outcome in the voting, a result which rode roughshod over the
Code's express intentions. Id. The court charged that the
debtor's plan did not develop classes sufficiently distinct to warrant a separate voice in evaluating the merits of the reorganization plan. Id.
For support, Judge Alito cited the recent opinions of three
other courts of appeal, all of which found improper classification
schemes similar to the one proposed by Route 37 Business Park
Associates. Id. In Matterof Greystone IIIJoint Venture, the Fifth Circuit held that a debtor could not classify a lender's $3.5 million
unsecured deficiency claim separately from other unsecured
claims, which totaled $10,000. Id. (citing Greystone III, 948 F.2d
134, 139 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72 (1992)). The
Fifth Circuit quipped that the golden rule concerning § 1122
classification schemes is " 'thou shalt not classify similar claims
differently in order to gerrymander an affirmative vote on a reorganization plan.' " Id. (quoting Greystone III, 948 F.2d at 139).
The Fourth Circuit concurred with the findings of the Greystone III court, ruling that a debtor improperly classified a
lender's $3.3 million unsecured deficiency claim from other
classes of unsecured debt. Id. at 160 (citing In re Bryson Properties
XVIII, 961 F.2d 496 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992)).
The Bryson Properties court promulgated that where the distribution method for unsecured claims is the same, different classifications are " 'highly suspect.' " Id. (quoting Bryson Properties, 961
F.2d at 502). The Fourth Circuit posited that without adequate
justification, such a scheme was a clear indicia of a debtor's efforts to manipulate voting. Id. (citing Bryson Properties, 961 F.2d at
502).
Finally, the court considered the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Matter of Lumber Exch. Bldg. Ltd. Partnership. Id. (citing Lumber
Exch., 968 F.2d 647 (1992)). The Eighth Circuit failed to sustain
a debtor's reorganization plan which classified an insurance company's $14 million deficiency claim separately from the claims of
unsecured trade creditors totalling $450,000. Id. The debtor
had argued that the insurance company's debt arose by operation
of law whereas the trade creditors' recourse debt had been bargained for. Id. (citing Lumber Exch., 968 F.2d at 649). The
Eighth Circuit concluded that justifying multiple classifications
by asserting that the creditors' claims arose differently was inconsequential and did not warrant distinct classifications. Id. at 161
(citing Lumber Exch., 968 F.2d at 649).
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In light of this recent precedent, the Third Circuit reversed
the denial of Hancock's lift stay motion, concluding that the
debtor's proposed plan lacked any reasonable prospect of confirmation. Id. The court then briefly addressed the debtor's explanations for the distinct classifications. Id. First, the debtor
argued that Hancock's claim was different from those of the unsecured trade creditors in that Hancock lacked recourse against
the general partners under state law. Id. The court contended
this reasoning obscured the relationship between state law and
Hancock's motion for relief from the automatic stay. Id. Hancock first needed to avoid the strictures of the Bankruptcy Code
in order to pursue its state law remedy. Id. Furthermore, the
debtor's assertion lacked nexus with the critical question of
whether the plan was a reasonable method of measuring creditors' votes. Id. Judge Alito observed that the Fifth and Eighth
Circuit dismissed similar arguments in the aforementioned cases.
Id.
Second, the debtor claimed that unsecured deficiency creditors have a proclivity towards voting against a reorganization
plan in order to benefit from the stay and subsequent foreclosure. Id. Contrariwise, it is advantageous for holders of other
unsecured claims to accept reorganization because an automatic
stay or liquidation will often leave those creditors without recompense. Id. Judge Alito found this argument unpersuasive, charging that it lacked any basis in the Code and was not consonant
with economic reality. Id. For example, the judge asserted that
trade creditors may, depending on the circumstances, vote to advance their interests as unsecured creditors or may, alternatively,
act in furtherance of their interests as future contractors. Id. at
161-62.
The Third Circuit wisely adopted the reasonableness requirement advanced by the Jersey City Medical Ctr. court in order
to prevent an apparent effort to gerrymander voting rights in a
reorganization plan. Section 1129(a) of the Bankruptcy Code remissly allows a debtor to "cram down" under the guise of multiple classifications. By creating separate categories of unsecured
debt - ostensibly to reflect the disparate treatment of these claims
under state law - a reorganization plan may serve only to circumvent the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code and disregard the
broader public interest. See id. at 158. Judge Alito successfully
balanced the interests of protecting creditors' rights and engendering a propitious reorganization with the Code's express
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purposes of assuring a fair confirmation vote and equitable treatment of claims.
Thomas C. Bigosinski

